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LET HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF:
SOLVING ORIGINALISM’S HISTORY
PROBLEM IN INTERPRETING THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
NEIL JOSEPH*
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is “in
shambles” and has “confounded the lower courts.”1 The Court does not
“employ [an] analytically sequenced, tiered framework for judicial
review” as it does in other constitutional contexts.2 The current justices
on the Court have widely divergent views on the Establishment
Clause’s meaning,3 and the lone test that the Court created has been
panned by several justices.4 Originalist judges, however, have had a
fairly consistent approach to interpreting the Establishment Clause.5
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1. Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari).
2. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 60
(2017).
3. Compare Dunn v. Ray, 139 S. Ct. 661, 662 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting from denial of
application to stay) (describing the Establishment Clause’s “core principle” as “denominational
neutrality”) with Frank Ravitch, Judge Kavanaugh on Law and Religion Issues, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 30, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/ 2018/07/judge-kavanaugh-on-law-and-religionissues/ (describing Judge Kavanaugh’s Establishment Clause approach as akin to Judge
Rehnquist’s, who “rarely agreed” that government action violated the Establishment Clause) and
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (showing Justice
Thomas’ view that Establishment Clause interpretation might depend on whether the actor is the
state or federal government).
4. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 614–615 (1971), as a “ghoul in a late night horror movie”); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346 (1987) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (noting the difficulties with the Lemon test); Sch. Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 400 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) (expressing consternation with the Lemon test).
5. See infra Part I (describing Scalia and Rehnquist’s approaches).
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This largely stems from the judges’ reliance on history. From Rehnquist
to Scalia to Thomas, originalist judges’ views have emphasized that
history is key in determining the meaning of the Establishment Clause.6
I argue that the originalist use of history in analyzing the
Establishment Clause’s limits on government is flawed. For the sake of
simplicity, I assume—as does current Establishment Clause
jurisprudence—that the Establishment Clause is incorporated against
the states. I make no judgment on whether that position is correct, and
it may not be. Rather, I argue that the use of history in determining the
scope of the Establishment Clause has been faulty. The object of the
Establishment Clause is a different question, and my conclusion very
well may have an impact on that analysis.
Originalist Establishment Clause jurisprudence, deployed in the
opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Scalia, is criticized for being an
unprincipled interpretation of the Establishment Clause. Originalists
encounter such criticism because the justices struggle to reconcile
historical practice with the strict command of the Establishment
Clause. In other contexts, particularly in interpreting the Free Speech
Clause, the Confrontation Clause, and the Eighth Amendment, history
is used more consistently in conducting originalist analysis. Given the
intent and public meaning of the Bill of Rights, historical evidence
should have the same place in Establishment Clause interpretation as
it does in Free Speech Clause interpretation.
I. ORIGINALIST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Court’s 1947 decision in Everson v. Board of Education7 “gave
birth to the modern Establishment Clause. . . .”8 Accordingly, only
relatively recent opinions are useful in outlining any Establishment
Clause theory. Furthermore, scholars identify Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas as the leading originalist justices on the
Establishment Clause.9 To avoid Justice Thomas’s focus on

6. See Steven K. Green, Bad History: The Lure of History in Establishment Clause
Adjudication, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1717, 1736–37 (2006) (describing the originalist justices’
reliance on history in interpreting the Establishment Clause).
7. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
8. Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment
Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 673, 675 (2002).
9. See, e.g., Andrew M. Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103
NW. L. REV. 727, 731–43 (2009) (describing the jurisprudence of Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, and
Scalia).
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incorporation,10 I will focus on the opinions of Justices Rehnquist and
Scalia.
A. Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the Establishment Clause
Justice William Rehnquist had a “massive and enduring impact” on
the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.11 Before Rehnquist’s
influence, the Court had taken a “wall of separation”12 approach to the
Establishment Clause and struck down most laws that breached that
wall.13 Rehnquist, however, firmly rejected the wall of separation
approach.14 His views changed the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence and are the touchstone when examining modern
originalist views on the subject.
Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree was the first
indication of his disapproval of the “wall of separation” theory. In
Jaffree, the plaintiff challenged a set of Alabama statutes that
authorized Christian prayer in all public schools.15 The Court held that
the statutes were “intended to convey a message of state approval of
prayer activities” and therefore violated the Establishment Clause.16
Rehnquist vigorously disagreed. He claimed that the Everson
command of a wall of separation between church and state was
historically inaccurate.17 After recounting the founding-era history
surrounding the Establishment Clause, Rehnquist concluded that the
Establishment Clause neither required neutrality nor prohibited
nondiscriminatory aid to religion.18 Additionally, like many after him,
he lamented the difficulties of the Lemon test.19 Rehnquist suggested
10. Justice Thomas argues that the Establishment Clause was only meant to constrain the
federal government and should not be incorporated against the states. See, e.g., Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 677–80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
11. Brett M. Kavanaugh, “From the Bench: The Constitutional Statesmanship of Chief
Justice William Rehnquist” (2017 Walter Berns Constitution Day Lecture) (available at
https://perma.cc/7243-K7E9).
12. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879)).
13. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down a law that forbid the
teaching of evolution); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (ruling that encouraged school prayer
is unconstitutional). Cf. Zellers v. Huff, 236 P.2d 949 (N.M. 1951) (showing the influence of the
“wall of separation” theory on state courts).
14. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“There is
simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the ‘wall
of separation’ that was constitutionalized in Everson.”).
15. See id. at 40.
16. Id. at 61.
17. Id. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 106.
19. Id. at 108–13 (discussing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614–15 (1971). See also
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that the intent of the Establishment Clause was only to “prohibit the
designation of any church as a ‘national’ one.”20 He was convinced that
it did not demand neutrality.21
Rehnquist’s majority opinion three years later in Bowen v.
Kendrick22 elucidated his approach to interpreting the Establishment
Clause. At issue in Bowen was a federal grant program related to
adolescent sexuality that funded, among other organizations,
institutions tied to religion.23 While nominally applying the Lemon test,
Justice Rehnquist primarily focused on the secular aspects of the grant
program.24 He found no issue with the program because its actual
purpose was secular and it did not have the primary effect of advancing
religion.25 He theorized that such funding programs could only violate
the Establishment Clause if Congress’s “‘actual purpose’ in passing [the
statute] was one of ‘endorsing religion’” or if “the aid flow[ed] to
institutions that [were] ‘pervasively sectarian.’”26 The fact that the
government was funding religious institutions was of little import to
Rehnquist—there needed to be something more for an Establishment
Clause challenge to succeed.
Twelve years later, Justice Rehnquist again found himself in the
dissent in Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe.27 In Santa Fe, the
plaintiffs alleged that the Sante Fe School District engaged in various
“proselytizing practices.”28 The primary issue was a school-wide
election to determine whether an invocation would be delivered at
football games.29 The Court held that the school’s policy violated the
Establishment Clause because it “establishe[d] an improper
majoritarian election on religion” and had “the purpose and create[ed]
Thomas C. Marks Jr. & Michael Bertolini, Lemon is a Lemon: Toward a Rational Interpretation
of the Establishment Clause, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 1, 2–13 (1997) (describing the difficulties with the
Lemon test); Michael Stokes Paulsen, Lemon is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 795, 800–13
(1993) (lamenting the difficulties of the Lemon test).
20. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 113.
21. See id. (“[N]othing in the Establishment Clause requires government to be strictly
neutral between religion and irreligion, nor does that Clause prohibit Congress or the States from
pursuing legitimate secular ends through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.”).
22. 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
23. Id. at 593–98.
24. Id. at 602–15.
25. Id. at 604, 605–12.
26. Id. at 604, 610.
27. 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
28. See id. at 295 (describing plaintiffs’ issues with the school district encouraging
membership in religious clubs, distributing Bibles, and allowing students to read Christian
invocations).
29. Id. at 297–98.
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the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at . . . important
school events.”30 Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justices Scalia
and Thomas. He took issue with the majority “[bristling] with hostility
to all things religious in public life.”31 He believed that an election
would sufficiently dissociate the prayer from the government, and
deferred to the school’s stated secular purpose.32 Finally, Justice
Rehnquist rejected the idea that the Establishment Clause required
content neutrality.33
Justice Rehnquist’s opinions in Jaffree, Bowers, and Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. help to broadly outline his views on the Establishment
Clause. He believed that, considering the the practices of the Founders,
the mere interaction of church and state was not nearly enough to raise
Establishment Clause issues.34 Moreover, he did not think that the
Establishment Clause required neutrality or government dissociation
from religion.35 A valid secular purpose would be enough to save a
challenged policy.36 In his view, a policy would have an Establishment
Clause problem only if the federal (or state) government designated an
official religion, endorsed religion, or funded pervasively sectarian
institutions.37
B. Justice Antonin Scalia and the Establishment Clause
Unsurprisingly, Justice Scalia’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
was guided by his views on interpreting the Constitution.38 Rehnquist,
as shown above, started the originalist pushback against the Everson
“wall of separation” approach. Scalia carried that mantle forward, as
the “field general of the Rehnquist Court’s moderate-to-conservative
bloc . . . [with] his troops ready to ‘storm the next walled city of
separation.’”39
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
(1988).
37.
38.

Id. at 317.
Id. at 318 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 321–22.
Id. at 325.
See id. at 318; Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985).
See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 113.
See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 322; Bowers v. Hardwick, 487 U.S. 589, 604

See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 113; Bowers, 487 U.S. at 604, 610.
See generally ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW (1997) (providing insight into Scalia’s interpretive methods).
39. Eric R. Claeys, Justice Scalia and the Religion Clauses: A Comment on Professor Epps,
21 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 349, 349 (2006) (quoting Garrett Epps, Some Animals Are More Equal
than Others: The Rehnquist Court and “Majority Religion,” 21 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 323, 326
(2006)).
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Scalia’s first opinion regarding the Establishment Clause appeared
as a dissent in Edwards v. Aguillard.40 There, parents of Louisiana
children challenged the Creationism Act, which forbade the teaching
of evolution unless it was taught alongside creationism.41 The Court
held that the Act “advance[d] a religious doctrine by requiring either
the banishment of the theory of evolution from public school
classrooms or the presentation of a religious viewpoint that rejects
evolution in its entirety,” and thus violated the Establishment Clause.42
Justice Scalia dissented and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Skeptically applying the Lemon test, Scalia argued that because the
act’s sole purpose was not to advance religion, it did not violate the
Establishment Clause as the First Amendment does not “forbid
legislators merely to act upon their religious convictions.”43 He
disregarded the fact that creation science aligned with the beliefs of
some religions.44 In fact, he argued that the Establishment Clause
sometimes requires government action—such as the statute at issue—
to prevent the inhibition of religion.45
Justice Scalia again dissented in Lee v. Weisman.46 In Weisman, the
plaintiff challenged a public school’s policy of having nonsectarian
prayers before its graduation.47 The Court held that the prayer practice
persuaded students “to participate in a religious exercise” and was thus
unconstitutional.48 Justice Scalia, meanwhile, focused on the history of
prayer during public ceremonies.49 He described the frequent use of
public prayer over time, up until the time the case was filed.50 He also
vehemently rejected the Court’s idea of psychological coercion,
believing that coercion could only be backed by threat of penalty.51 He
believed that the Establishment Clause only prohibited establishment
“coerced by the force of law.”52

40. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
41. Id. at 596.
42. Id. at 596–97.
43. Id. at 612–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 616.
45. See id. at 616–18 (also noting that similarly, the Free Exercise Clause sometimes
required government action).
46. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
47. See id. at 581–84.
48. Id. at 599.
49. Id. at 633 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 633–35.
51. See id. at 637–39, 642.
52. Id. at 641 (emphasis omitted).
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Justice Scalia found himself in both the majority and the dissent in
the two “Ten Commandments cases”—Van Orden v. Perry53 and
McCreary County v. ACLU.54 The two cases both turned on the vote of
Justice Breyer.55 Both cases involved a state display of the Ten
Commandments: one on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol, and
the other in two Kentucky county courthouses.56 Justice Souter wrote
the majority opinion in McCreary County. He used “neutrality as an
interpretive guide” and held that the display had a “predominantly
religious purpose.”57 Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion in
Van Orden and held that displays had “dual significance, partaking of
both religion and government.”58 He concluded they did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
Justice Scalia explained his views on the displays in his dissent in
McCreary County. He rejected the idea that religion in public life had
to be nondenominational.59 He argued that the nation’s historical
practices “demonstrate[d] that there is a distance between the
acknowledgement of a single Creator and the establishment of
religion.”60 Because most Americans were monotheists (Christians,
Jews, and Muslims), he reasoned that honoring the Ten
Commandments was “indistinguishable . . . from publicly honoring
God.”61 Scalia found his support in the official actions of the Founders
and the First Congress, which he believed were the best evidence of
how the Founders meant the Establishment Clause to be read.62
Scalia’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence mirrored Rehnquist’s.
He believed that as long as the sole purpose of a government action
was not religious, it would not run into Establishment Clause
problems.63 Neither the fact that a policy was aligned with a religion nor
the fact that it promoted monotheism was problematic.64 He believed
that the government did not need to act neutrally toward religion; it
53. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
54. 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. Thomas Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions? Justice Scalia, the Ten
Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 1097
(2006).
56. McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 851; Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 681.
57. McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 874, 881.
58. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 691.
59. McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 893.
60. Id. at 894.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 895–97.
63. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 612–15 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 616; McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 894.
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merely could not establish a national religion by the force of law.65
II. A CRITICISM OF ORIGINALIST ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE
Scalia’s and Rehnquist’s views on the Establishment Clause have
been heavily criticized. Justice Scalia has been accused of veiling his
value choices under a cloak of unbiased judicial interpretation.66 Both
Scalia and Rehnquist have been criticized for historical inaccuracies.67
Because their views are substantially the same, the criticisms are alike.
Most focus on their methods of determining the original intent of the
Founders. Specifically, critics allege that determining the intent of the
Establishment Clause is uniquely difficult due to the conflicting and
incomplete sources available to interpreters.
Interpreters of the Establishment Clause have a unique problem
when attempting to determine its meaning. While Rehnquist and Scalia
believed that the historical evidence strongly favored their
jurisprudential approach, some scholars have shown that the historical
evidence does not clearly support any one interpretation.68 Because of
this, critics of originalist Establishment Clause jurisprudence believe
that “there is no single, objective original meaning that can be
discerned from the incomplete and often contradictory historical
record . . . .”69 Thus, they see Scalia’s and Rehnquist’s “historical
analysis” as nothing more than a mere choice between many equally
persuasive authorities.
Professor Leonard Levy recounts the history of religion in the
United States, specifically up until the time of the passage of the Bill of
Rights.70 Most colonies had an established religion and discriminated
against non-believers.71 Following the Revolution, however, some New

65. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 641 (1992).
66. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 22 U.
HAW. L. REV. 385, 385 (2000).
67. See Koppelman, supra note 9, at 731–41 (pointing out the holes in both Justices’
historical examination).
68. See Frank Guliuzza III, The Practical Perils of an Original Intent-Based Judicial
Philosophy: Originalism and the Church-State Test Case, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 343, 382 (1993) (“The
conclusions of the separationists and the accommodationists, though they are looking at exactly
the same historical evidence, are often 180 degrees apart.”).
69. Colby, supra note 55, at 1138.
70. See generally LEONARD LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1994).
71. Id. at 1.
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England states pushed for greater separation of church and state.72
During the framing of the Constitution, there was a “widespread
understanding . . . that the new central government would have no
power whatever to legislate on the subject of religion.”73 Finally, in
ratifying the Establishment Clause itself, there is some indication that
the state ratifiers understood that it would not be interpreted
narrowly.74
Whatever that broad history of religion in the early Republic might
have indicated, Rehnquist and Scalia particularly focused on the views
and actions of James Madison and some of his contemporaries during
and after the framing of the Bill of Rights. For example, after describing
those views in his Jaffree dissent, Rehnquist characterized Madison as
believing that the Establishment Clause was “designed to prohibit the
establishment of a national religion . . . not . . . as requiring neutrality on
the part of government between religion and irreligion.”75 Similarly, in
McCreary County, Scalia described the various actions of the Framers
and took them to be highly probative of the meaning of the
Establishment Clause.76 The views and actions of the Framers came to
be the sources that the two justices primarily relied on in determining
the original meaning of the Establishment Clause.
The use of those sources of evidence has drawn significant criticism.
Take the example of nonpreferentialist aid. As shown above, Justice
Rehnquist believed that the Establishment Clause did not forbid such
aid,77 relying in part on historical practice at the time.78 Professor Doug
Laycock disagrees. He argues that the Framers’ actions are not by
themselves a good indicator of what is constitutional.79 To effectively
use their actions as evidence, an interpreter must “identify some
principled distinction between the practices the Framers accepted and
those they rejected,” and determine whether that implicit principle
should be followed.80 After examining the Framers’ actions, Laycock
72. See id. at 28–51 (describing actions that some New England states took to separate
church and state). Levy describes some of the actions that Southern states took as well, see id. at
52–78.
73. Id. at 93.
74. See id. at 111 (describing how Virginia ratifiers understood the Establishment Clause).
75. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985).
76. See 545 U.S. 844, 893–94 (2005).
77. See infra Part II.A.
78. See Douglas Laycock,“Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original
Intent, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 913 (1986).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 914.
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determines that the distinction to be drawn was not between
preferential and nonpreferential aid, but between financial and
nonfinancial aid.81 Essentially, he believes that Rehnquist needed to
inquire more subtly into the historical record to determine what the
Framers’ actions said about their views of the Establishment Clause.
Critics have also attacked originalist justices’ reliance on Madison
and his contemporaries to justify their positions. Once again, the
example of nonpreferential aid is apt. Levy argues that
nonpreferentialists are “wrong in thinking that they have a prop in
Madison.”82 He analyzes Madison’s actions both as a Framer and as
President83 and concludes that the Madisonian view is that “religion
will exist in greater purity without the aid of government.”84 This view
not only rejects nonpreferentialism, but also requires the Everson wall
of separation.85 Similarly, Professor Frank Guliuzza thoroughly
examines the writing of scholars who attempt to interpret the
intentions of the First Congress in enacting the Establishment Clause.86
He concludes that in looking at the same evidence, proponents and
opponents of original intention interpretation can come to opposite
conclusions.87 He posits that this may be because the originalists have
“simply propos[ed] a different interpretation of the historical
evidence.”88 The evidence is the same, but the nonprefentialists claim
that their interpretation is superior, without offering reasons for why
this is so.
Historical evidence can support both the nonpreferentialist and the
strict separationist, rendering it unhelpful in determining the original
intent of the Framers. In Van Orden and McCreary County, for
example, Scalia and Rehnquist deferred to the statements of George
Washington and John Adams to support their idea that such an
intertwining of religion and government was not unconstitutional.89
81. Id. at 914–19.
82. Levy, supra note 70, at 114.
83. See id. at 115–34.
84. Id. at 144.
85. See id. at 145 n.91 (noting that Madison in his “Memorial and Remonstrance” talked
about the wall of separation).
86. See generally Guliuzza, supra note 68.
87. Id. at 382.
88. Id. at 383.
89. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 687 (2005) (recounting George Washington’s
Thanksgiving Proclamation, which continuously mentioned God); McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545
U.S. 844, 887–88 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using John Adams’ letter to the Massachusetts
Militia saying that “[o]ur Constitution was made only for a moral and religious people.” (quoting
9 Works of John Adams 229 (C. Adams ed. 1971))).
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Justice Stevens took issue with that deference in his Van Orden dissent.
He noted that Thomas Jefferson—another Framer—had refused to
issue a statement similar to Washington’s for fear of violating the
Establishment Clause.90 He also quoted James Madison—who
Rehnquist and Scalia cited frequently—to argue that Government
should be entirely divested from religion.91 Opponents of Scalia and
Rehnquist continually cite the Framers’ actions and views in their
condemnation of the originalist interpretation.92
In sum, critics of Scalia and Rehnquist believe that the justices’
determination of the original intent is incomplete and arbitrary. While
they do point to historical facts, the critics disagree with the
characterization of such evidence as dispositive. Some historical
practices, views, and writings may point toward nonpreferentialism, but
a closer or different examination may indicate otherwise. Finally, the
fact that both strict separationists and nonpreferentialists can both
point to historical evidence for support undercuts the originalists’
argument that their interpretation is required by the original intent.
III. ORIGINALISM’S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE PROBLEM
So what is the issue? Why do originalists have such a problem with
the Establishment Clause? Why do people consistently claim that in
interpreting the Establishment Clause, originalists fail to follow the
principles that guide their interpretation in other settings?93 In
interpreting the Establishment Clause, originalists have trouble with
history. There is “bad history.”94 And there is good history.95 But the
main trouble that permeates originalist Establishment Clause

90. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 724.
91. Id. at 725. See, e.g., McCreary Cty., 545 U.S. at 888 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
Madison’s First Inaugural Address); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 93 (1984) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (citing Madison’s remarks in the House of Representatives).
92. See, e.g., Caroline Mala Corbin, Justice Scalia, the Establishment Clause, and Christian
Privilege, 15 FIRST AM. L. REV. 185, 214 (2016) (using Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments to criticize Scalia); Koppelman, supra note 9, at 746–48 (using the
same to criticize Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnquist); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 612–16 (1992)
(Souter, J., concurring) (using the debates in the First Congress to argue that the Establishment
Clause prohibited both preferential and nonpreferential aid).
93. See Koppelman, supra note 9, at 728 (outlining the “proper originalist way” to interpret
the Establishment Clause and then asserting that originalist judges do not use that method); John
C. Jeffries Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 279, 281 (2001) (“Whatever the modern [Establishment Clause] decisions may be thought
to represent . . . they cannot persuasively be attributed to original understanding.”).
94. See Green, supra note 6, at 1717.
95. See infra, part II (describing Scalia and Rehnquist’s use of history).
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jurisprudence is squaring the historical practices of the Founders with
the command of the Establishment Clause itself.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has generally relied on history
to some extent. Take, for example, Town of Greece v. Galloway.96 In
Town of Greece, the plaintiffs challenged a town board’s policy of
having volunteers conduct prayers before the start of each town hall
meeting.97 Relying on the Court’s opinion in Marsh v. Chambers,98
Justice Kennedy found the practice to be constitutional. He focused on
the “unambiguous and unbroken history” of legislative prayer, which
helped guide his Establishment Clause interpretation.99 Justice Alito
also emphasized that historical practice in his concurrence.100 Even
Justice Kagan in her dissent acknowledged that the Founders’ tradition
gave legislative prayer a “distinctive constitutional warrant.”101
So history does have a role in interpreting the Establishment
Clause, for both non-originalists and originalists. But originalist
interpreters have erred in two ways. First, they have failed to offer a
principled approach as to what Founding-era evidence should be
determinative rather than informative. Second, and relatedly, they have
inconsistently determined how much weight they should put on specific
evidence from history. And these errors engender the criticisms
discussed above.102
Compare Town of Greece—where all of the justices agreed that the
practices of the Founders were highly probative of how to interpret the
Establishment Clause—to Rehnquist’s dissent in Jaffree. There,
Rehnquist quickly discounted the “wall of separation” from Thomas
Jefferson—a Framer in his own right.103 He discussed the advantages
someone like James Madison might have had over Jefferson.104 He then
recounted the founding debates over the Bill of Rights and the
Religion Clauses.105 This included statements from Madison,
resolutions from representatives, and indicative actions from the

96. 572 U.S. 565 (2014).
97. Id. at 570–71.
98. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
99. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792).
100. See id. at 600–03 (Alito, J., concurring).
101. Id. at 622 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
102. See supra Part II.A.
103. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92 (1985).
104. Id.
105. See id. at 92–103 (recounting, among other things, James Madison’s statements in the
House of Representatives as well as other Representative’s thoughts).
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Framers themselves.106 Rehnquist concluded that this evidence meant
that the Establishment Clause had the “well-accepted meaning” of
forbidding the establishment of a national religion and the preference
between religions, but nothing more.107
In deploying history in such a way, Rehnquist runs squarely into the
criticisms outlined above. For example, he does not determine why the
First Congress decided not to limit land grants for schools in the
Northwest Territory to public schools (a limitation which Professor
Laycock’s proposed approach would require).108 He merely says that “it
seems highly unlikely that the House of Representatives would
simultaneously consider proposed amendments to the Constitution
and enact an important piece of territorial legislation which conflicted
with the intent of these proposals.”109 But that is not an effective guiding
principle, as it is well established that the Founders did act in
unconstitutional ways.110 Furthermore, in her Jaffree concurrence,
Justice O’Connor criticized Rehnquist’s use of history. She argued that
Rehnquist’s dissent did not show that the Founders specifically
encouraged prayer in public schools.111 The history Rehnquist used is in
stark contrast to the use of history in Town of Greece. While the
majority in Town of Greece identified a specific practice that had
persisted since the time of the Founders, Rehnquist used founding-era
debates, actions, and pronouncements to determine the original intent
behind the Establishment Clause and apply it definitively.
Justice Scalia similarly relied on history in his McCreary County
dissent.112 And as shown above, the majority also relied on history in
disagreeing with him.113 Their only disagreement was about how to
weigh the historical evidence. In addressing Justice Stevens’s concerns,
Scalia claimed that because he relied on “official acts and official
proclamations of the United States” and “statements of Founders who
occupied federal office, and spoke in at least a quasi-official capacity,”
his evidence was more compelling than Stevens’s.114 He analyzed
Stevens’s evidence, which included the Memorial and Remonstrance,
106. Id. at 97–106.
107. Id. at 106.
108. See id. at 100.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) (overturning the Judiciary Act of
1789, which was passed by the Founders).
111. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 80 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
112. See Part I.B.
113. See Part II.A.
114. McCreary Cty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 895–96 (2005).
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Thomas Jefferson’s refusal to issue a Thanksgiving Proclamation, and
letters from Madison, discounting it as non-official.115 But in Van Orden,
Stevens turned the tables: he criticized Scalia for “fail[ing] to account
for the acts and publicly espoused views of other influential leaders.”116
Stevens was right to note that Scalia merely ignored and minimized the
historical evidence that contradicted him. His reasoning—the
unofficial nature of Stevens’s evidence—falls flat, as it seems to be
nothing but an argument that furthers Scalia’s reasoning. And so again
it seems that the interpretation is a choice of historical evidence more
than anything else.
At bottom, using history is valid. Even non-originalists have
accepted that history has a powerful and sometimes dispositive effect
on the Establishment Clause. But not in every instance. A single action
of the Founders is not determinative of its constitutionality. Nor should
some historical evidence be more persuasive than others because it is
“official.” There must be a better way to use history in interpreting the
Establishment Clause.
IV. USING HISTORY IN OTHER CONTEXTS
An originalist understanding of any part of the Constitution
requires historical inquiry. Because, as shown above, the originalist use
of history in the Establishment Clause context has been unpersuasive,
examining history’s use in originalist interpretation in other contexts is
helpful in determining its proper role. History is prevalent in the
originalist jurisprudence in the Free Speech, Confrontation Clause, and
Eighth Amendment contexts.
A. History’s Role in Interpreting the Free Speech Clause
History has played an important part in outlining Free Speech
jurisprudence. Specifically, it helps to decide what the First
Amendment does not protect. For example, in United States v.
Stevens,117 the government argued that a restriction on certain
depictions of animal cruelty, “crush videos,”118 was not protected by the
First Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed. Justice Roberts—
joined by all except Justice Alito—explained that “‘[f]rom 1791 to the
present’ . . . the First Amendment has ‘permitted restrictions upon the
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 724 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
559 U.S. 460 (2010).
For an explanation of crush videos, see Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464–66.

LET HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

LET HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF

11/18/2019 2:08 PM

15

content of speech in a few limited areas,’ and has never ‘included a
freedom to disregard these traditional limitations.’”119 While the
government argued that the United States had a long history of
prohibiting animal cruelty, Roberts was more concerned about whether
depictions of animal cruelty were historically prohibited.120 Roberts was
explicit: for something to be outside of the protection of the First
Amendment, it had to be within a “previously recognized, longestablished category of unprotected speech.”121
Although the Court had not been so explicit about the importance
of history in the years before, its explanation was consistent with its
prior rulings. For example, in Roth v. United States, the Court
considered a challenge to a federal obscenity statute.122 In explaining
why the obscenity statute was not unconstitutional, the Court noted
that not only had it always assumed that obscenity was not protected
by the First Amendment, but the history of the United States bolstered
that assumption as well.123 The Court noted that many states
criminalized profanity and that it had been criminalized as early as
1712.124 It cited “contemporaneous evidence to show that obscenity . . .
was outside the protection [of the First Amendment].”125
In the Free Speech context, history defines the scope of the Clause’s
protection. History is important because of the language of the First
Amendment. The command is extreme: “Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”126 But no court thought that
the Amendment protected all speech, as there were “historic and
traditional categories [of limitations] long familiar to the bar.”127 And
to find those limitations, one had to conduct a detailed historical
inquiry into the precise depictions and speech that the United States
community has consistently held to be not protected by the First
Amendment. That does include obscenity, defamation, fraud, and

119. Id. at 468 (quoting R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)).
120. Id. at 469.
121. Id. at 471.
122. 354 U.S. 476, 479 (1957).
123. Id. at 481–82.
124. Id. at 482.
125. Id. at n.13 (citing various founding-era laws that criminalized obscenity).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
127. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 468 (2010) (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 127 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
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incitement.128 But that does not include depictions of animal cruelty,
hate speech, and pornography.129
B. History’s Role in Interpreting the Confrontation Clause
History has also played an important role in determining the
policies that the Confrontation Clause furthers and the rights it
protects. Any interpretation of the Clause requires an examination of
history. The motivations underlying the Confrontation Clause can be
traced to the Roman and British common law times, long before the
United States was founded.130 History is vital for the Confrontation
Clause to be fully understood and applied.
Justice Scalia used history to understand and apply the
Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington.131 Crawford involved
a defendant’s challenge to the state’s use of a police tape-recording of
his wife’s testimony when she would not testify due to marital
privilege.132 To determine whether this violated the Confrontation
Clause, Justice Scalia looked beyond the ambiguous text.133 He turned
to history, focusing on the Clause’s English common-law roots.134 He
then turned to its use in the colonies, noting that many of their
declarations of rights “guaranteed a right of confrontation.”135 He
finally examined early state-court decisions about the right of
confrontation.136
After examining the text, Scalia drew two conclusions about the
Confrontation Clause: first, the “principal evil” at which the
Confrontation Clause was directed,137 and second, a specific policy that
the Framers would have supported.138 Specifically, Scalia said that “the
128. See id. at 468 (citing Roth, 354 U.S. at 483 (obscenity); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250, 254–55 (1952) (defamation); Va. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (fraud); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49 (1969) (per curiam)
(incitement)).
129. See Stevens, 559 U.S. at 482 (finding unconstitutional the statute prohibiting crush
videos), Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (protecting virtual child
pornography), R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 396 (1992) (protecting racist cross
burning).
130. Frank T. Read, The New Confrontation-Hearsay Dilemma, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 5–6
(1972).
131. 541 U.S. 36, 43 (2004).
132. Id. at 40.
133. Id. at 42–43.
134. Id. at 43–47.
135. Id. at 47–48.
136. Id. at 49–50.
137. Id. at 50.
138. Id. at 53–54.
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Framers would not have allowed admission of testimonial statements
of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to
testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.”139 What is critical is the fact that history, not reason or
policy, led Scalia to two conclusions. First, a conclusion about the
general intent of the clause. And second, an actual policy that the clause
itself commanded. The historical understanding of both the general
purposes behind the Clause and the specific policies the Clause
pursued determined how the Clause itself applied.
C. History’s Role in Interpreting the Eighth Amendment
History also plays a central role for originalists in interpreting the
Eighth Amendment. Justice Scalia approached the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause as “intend[ing] to prohibit only certain inherently
cruel forms of punishment . . . that were already unacceptable by the
end of the eighteenth century.”140 This interpretation would mean that
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause would not outlaw sentences
that might today be considered unfair, such as disproportionate
sentencing or capital punishment.141
Professor John Stinneford has extensively explored the role of
history in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. He starts with the term
“unusual” and argues that understanding the term requires deciphering
what early Americans understood the term to mean.142 He claims that
they understood it as addressing actions that were “contrary to ‘long
usage.’”143 After recounting the history during colonial times, the
Revolution, the Founding, and early case law,144 he concludes that an
unusual punishment is one that is “contrary to our longstanding
traditions.”145 His analysis is similar for the word “cruel,”146 and he

139. Id.
140. John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a
Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1742 (2008) (citing Harmelin v. Michigan, 501
U.S. 957, 966–85 (1991)). Scalia did note that he could be considered a “faint-hearted originalist”
with respect to the Eighth Amendment, see Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
864 (1989). But the very fact that he called himself faint-hearted means he acknowledged what
originalism required in the Eighth Amendment context.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1770.
143. Id.
144. See id. at 1771–1815.
145. Id. at 1815.
146. See John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L.J. 441, 473–93
(recounting the historical understanding of the word “cruel”).

LET HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF (DO NOT DELETE)

18

11/18/2019 2:08 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[VOL. 15

concludes that the term means “unjustly harsh” and does not require
cruel intent.147
Although the use of history in the Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is slightly different than in the Free Speech and
Confrontation Clause contexts, an originalist approach still requires a
detailed inquiry into history. Because the words of the Eighth
Amendment are ambiguous, history determines its meaning.
Originalist Eighth Amendment jurisprudence uses historical inquiry in
the same manner as the Free Speech Clause and Confrontation Clause
contexts, as history defines what the words mean.
V. THE SOLUTION
As shown in the previous Part, history is an essential tool for
originalists in interpreting the Constitution. Constitutional
interpretation generally deploys historical analysis in order to
determine the meaning and scope of specific clauses. Nevertheless, the
originalist use of history in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is
flawed. Critics of this approach make valid arguments.
Like the Confrontation Clause and Eighth Amendment, the
Establishment Clause requires the use of history to discover the
meaning of its particular words. Originalist Establishment Clause
jurisprudence needs to reorient itself to become more consistent with
originalist principles. This requires aligning Establishment Clause use
of history with the orisginalists’ use of history in interpreting the Free
Speech Clause (as shown above).148 In doing so, I first examine
originalist Free Speech doctrine as a whole and conclude that its use of
history is actually originalist. I then argue that the text of the two
clauses and the original intent and public meaning of the Bill of Rights
indicate that they should be interpreted similarly. Finally, I identify
what this means: the Establishment Clause should reject government
intervention in all cases except where there is a clearly identified,
principled, widespread, and long-standing historical practice of
government involvement.

147. Id. at 494.
148. See supra section IV.A.
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A. The Originalist Use of History in Current Free Speech Doctrine
Modern free speech jurisprudence may not, on the whole, be
originalist.149 But that is an undertaking for a different piece. Here, I
merely seek to establish that the Court’s use of history in the free
speech context is originalist. To do that, I will mainly study Justice
Scalia’s free speech jurisprudence and his use of history. In doing so, I
will show that his use of history was quite similar to Roberts’s use of
history in defining the scope of the Free Speech Clause in Stevens.
Justice Scalia anticipated Roberts’s characterization of the free
speech clause in Stevens in his majority opinion in R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, Minnesota.150 He recognized what Justice Roberts would lay out
nineteen years later in Stevens: the scope of First Amendment
protection was determined by history. He wrote that “[f]rom 1791 to
the present . . . our society . . . has permitted restrictions upon the
content of speech in a few limited areas,” calling this a “limited
categorical approach.”151 This was not because those topics were not
speech; rather, it was because of “their constitutionally proscribable
content.”152 The proscribability of such content was wholly determined
by history.
His acceptance of this line of thinking was affirmed in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association.153 In Brown, video game
companies filed a challenge to a California law that restricted the sale
or rental of violent video games to minors.154 Justice Scalia held that the
law was unconstitutional and violated the First Amendment.155 What is
important, however, was Scalia’s adherence to and approval of the
Court’s reasoning in Stevens.156 He first generally characterized the
basic command of the First Amendment: that “government has no
power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”157 He then listed the matters outside of First
Amendment protection, explaining that punishment of such speech
149. See David Lat, Justice Scalia, Originalism, Free Speech And The First Amendment,
ABOVE THE LAW (November 22, 2016), https://abovethelaw.com/2016/11/justice-scaliaoriginalism-free-speech-and-the-first-amendment/ (relating Michael McConnell’s comment that
“free speech has been kind of a desert when it comes to originalism”).
150. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
151. Id. at 383.
152. Id.
153. 564 U.S. 786 (2011).
154. Id. at 789.
155. Id. at 805.
156. See supra Part IV.A.
157. Brown, 564 U.S. at 790–91 (quoting Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002)).
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“[has] never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”158 In
rejecting California’s claim that history did not matter in Stevens,159
Scalia clung to Justice Roberts’s language. He held that content was not
outside of First Amendment protection “without persuasive evidence
that [such] a novel restriction on content [was] part of a long . . .
tradition of proscription.”160 Because violence was consistently held to
not be obscene, there had to be a “longstanding tradition in [the United
States] of specially restricting children’s access to depictions of
violence” for the California law to be constitutional.161 After recounting
the history of violence in youth entertainment over time, he concluded
that there was never a clearly held and longstanding tradition of the
country restricting it.162
Other Scalia opinions confirm that this was how he viewed history
in interpreting the Free Speech Clause. For example, in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White, he considered a Minnesota Supreme Court
rule that prohibited judicial candidates from “announcing their views
on disputed legal and political issues.”163 The Eighth Circuit sustained
the rule, relying “on the fact that a pervasive practice of prohibiting
judicial candidates from discussing disputed legal and political issues
developed during the last half of the 20th century.”164 Scalia
acknowledged that a “‘universal and long-established’ tradition of
prohibiting certain conduct creates ‘a strong presumption’ that the
prohibition is constitutional.”165 But he disputed the Eighth Circuit’s
holding that this specific practice was longstanding or universal.166 He
dove deep into the history of judicial elections at the time of the
founding and found no evidence of the same restrictions.167 While there
were some restrictions on judicial conduct, by no means were they
deeply held as traditions or widespread.168

158. Id. at 791 (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)).
159. Id. at 792.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 795.
162. See id. at 795–98.
163. 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002).
164. Id. at 785.
165. Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 375–77 (1995) (Scalia,
J., dissenting)).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 785–86.
168. Id. at 786.

LET HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF (DO NOT DELETE)

LET HISTORY REPEAT ITSELF

2020]

11/18/2019 2:08 PM

21

Finally, Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission169 used history in the same way. While the
dissent attempted to explain the Framers’ views about the role of
corporations in society,170 Scalia specifically examined early speech
restrictions as they pertained to corporations. He noted that there was
no “textual exception for speech by corporations” even though
corporations existed and “actively petitioned” the early
Government.171 He also pointed out that the dissent offered no
evidence—save for “postratification practice”172—that “the First
Amendment’s unqualified text was originally understood to exclude . . .
associational speech from its protection.”173 Finally, he concluded that
the historical evidence “provide[d] no support for the proposition that
the First Amendment excludes conduct of artificial legal entities from
the scope of its protection.”174 Essentially, Scalia argued in Citizens
United that there was a historical burden. The burden was on the
dissenters—who argued that corporations were outside of the scope of
First Amendment protection—to prove that history showed their
argument was consistent with a longstanding historical practice.
Justice Scalia’s vision of free speech jurisprudence was similar to
Justice Roberts’s view in Stevens. He anticipated Roberts’s
characterization of unprotected speech as being within a “previously
recognized, long-established category of unprotected speech”175 in
R.A.V. and supported that sentiment in Brown. He also used history to
determine whether speech was outside protection in White and
demanded more historical evidence in order to establish the same in
Citizens United.
B.

The Establishment Clause and Free Speech Clause Jurisprudence
Should Use History in Similar Ways

Having established that the Court’s use of history in free speech
jurisprudence is originalist, I now turn to why that should inform
originalist Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Although the two
clauses do appear in the same Amendment of the Constitution,176 that
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See id. at 425–32 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 388–89 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 389 n.5.
Id. at 389.
Id. at 390.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010).
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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does not mean they should be interpreted similarly—and the Supreme
Court has not done so. But an originalist interpretation should use
history consistently. First, the text of the two clauses is similarly
structured, making history useful in the same way for both. And second,
an originalist reading of the Bill of Rights—intent or public meaning
focused—shows that the ultimate goal of the Bill of Rights as a whole
was to impose restrictions on the federal government.
The relevant parts of the First Amendment command that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . .
or abridging the freedom of speech.”177 Both clauses are clear as to the
substance that they are addressing: establishment of religion and the
freedom of speech.178 The verbs, however, that cause consternation. The
Establishment Clause is vague because of its use of the word
“respecting.”179 And the Free Speech Clause is distinctly vague because
of its use of the word “abridging.”180
Philosophers of language and constitutional historians may argue
that those two verbs have specific and ascertainable meanings. For
example, constitutional historians have attempted to define the scope
of the word “respecting” by examining the history surrounding the
codification of the First Amendment in general and the Establishment
Clause in particular.181 This logic should be flipped on its head. With
such ambiguous words, an interpreter should first understand what the
purpose of the substantive guarantee was (as I attempt to do below).
Then, the interpreter should use history to determine what actions, in
light of that purpose, are constitutional or not. This method of
interpretation is what the Supreme Court’s approach to free speech
interpretation has looked like, time and again.182

177. Id.
178. I acknowledge that some may quibble with my assertion that those concepts are clear
on their face. This point is well taken, but I merely wish to show that the objects of First
Amendment protection are clear, while the actions that the government may not take with respect
to that object are less clear.
179. See Andrew Koppelman, Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1831, 1834 (2009) (explaining that the establishment clause is ambiguous).
180. See Philip B. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The First Amendment’s
Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Press Clauses, 29 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 2 (1980) (describing the
“basic ambiguity” in the free speech clause).
181. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Texualism and Originalism in
Establishment Clause Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 583–96 (2011).
182. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–53 (2011) (describing the motivations
behind the First Amendment and then holding that offensive speech about a matter of public
concern was protected by the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989)
(describing the “bedrock principle” of the First Amendment and then explaining that there was
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To determine what the purpose of the substantive guarantee of the
Establishment Clause was, we must look at the Bill of Rights as a whole.
Originalists have attempted to understand text by looking at its
author’s original intent or at what the original public meaning of the
text would have been.183 One reaches the same conclusion about the
purpose of codifying the Bill of Rights using either method.
Determining the original intent and public meaning of the Bill of
Rights is a massive undertaking that I cannot accomplish myself. In this
section, however, I aim only to summarize some of the works that show
that the Bill of Rights—and thus the Establishment Clause—was
broadly targeted at furthering the idea of limited government.
The Framers intended the Bill of Rights to be a constraint on the
federal government. Although the original drafting of the Constitution
imposed some limits on the federal government, “the Bill of Rights
contained explicit limitations on government.”184 After the
Constitution was ratified, influential individuals such as James Madison
believed that “the American people expected the First Congress to
deal immediately with amendments protecting personal liberty. . . .”185
Many citizens were “concerned about the potentially sweeping powers
that Congress would have under the Constitution. . . .”186 As such, the
“Bill of Rights serves primarily and fundamentally as a means of
limiting government . . . . [It] simply provides an additional
constitutional mandate for limited government.”187 Those who opposed
the Bill of Rights did so not out of support for bigger government but
because they believed the Constitution already constrained the
government enough.188 Those who supported it did so because they did
not trust that the Constitution as written would sufficiently limit
no historical exception allowing for regulation of flag burning); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S.
476, 484, 481 (1957) (describing the purpose of the freedom of speech and using history to
determine that obscenity is outside of that freedom).
183. See Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 609
(2004) (distinguishing between types of originalism that focus on the “concrete intentions of
individual drafters” rather than on “public meaning”).
184. Patrick M. Garry, Liberty through Limits: The Bill of Rights as Limited Government
Provisions, 62 SMU L. REV. 1745, 1757 (2009).
185. RICHARD LABUNSKI, JAMES MADISON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE BILL OF RIGHTS
195 (2006).
186. Id. at 197.
187. Garry, supra note 184, at 1757.
188. See id. at 1758 (“According to the Federalists, the structural design of the Constitution
would effectively protect individual’s rights and liberties by granting only limited powers to the
new federal government.”). See, e.g., LABUNSKI¸ supra note 185, at 223 (describing how Roger
Sherman thought an original draft of the Establishment Clause was unnecessary because he
believed Congress already had no power to establish religion).
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government.189 The argument over the Bill of Rights was one over
necessity; its opponents and proponents agreed that its effect was to
constrain the government.
The public would have understood the Bill of Rights to be
government-constraining as well.190 Vasan Kesavan and Michael
Paulsen have identified “second-best” sources of original public
meaning.191 These sources are to be consulted if the “text of the
Constitution does not conclusively answer a constitutional question”
and include the public writings of the Federalists and Anti-Federalists,
the public debates of the state ratifying conventions, early precedents
of the Constitution, and works of early constitutional commentators.192
I will touch briefly on the public writings of the Federalists and AntiFederalists and the ratification debates of the Bill of Rights, which also
show that the Bill of Rights would have been understood as
government-constraining.
The Antifederalists started campaigning for a Bill of Rights
“immediately after the Constitutional Convention adjourned.”193
Individuals such as Richard Henry Lee wrote that the great power that
would be available to the federal government had the potential to
corrupt and spurred the need for an explicit declaration of rights.194 In
response, Federalists such as James Wilson argued that a bill of rights
was not needed “because it would imply that the federal government
had ‘some degree of power’ in every area . . . .”195 This idea became the
“‘official’ Federalist explanation for the lack of a federal bill of rights”
and was accepted by all Federalists, including James Madison.196 The
debate was one of consequences: neither the Federalists nor the Anti-

189. See Garry, supra note 184, at 1759 (“The Anti-Federalists did not trust that the structural
provisions in the original Constitution would sufficiently limit the power of government . . . .”).
190. Randy Barnett has pointed out that the Establishment Clause itself is written as a
limitation on (admittedly federal) government power. See Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s
Majoritarian Difficulty, 60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 949 (2008) (describing the Establishment Clause as
a “limitation of federal power”).
191. Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1148 (2003).
192. Id.
193. John P. Kaminski, Restoring the Grand Security: The Debate Over a Federal Bill of
Rights, 1787-1792, 33 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 887, 893 (1983).
194. Id. at 893–94 (quoting 13 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 323 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1981)).
195. Id. at 895 (quoting JAMES WILSON, AN ADDRESS TO A MEETING OF THE CITIZENS OF
PHILADELPHIA (1787), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 528–32 (1971)).
196. Id. at 895–96.
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Federalists disagreed that the provisions in the Bill of Rights itself
would be constraining on the government.
The ratification of the Bill of Rights in the states further shows that
the public would have understood it as government-constraining. Not
much is known about the debates over the Bill of Rights,197 but what is
known is that those who supported it focused on its effect on the
government. John Hancock told Massachusetts ratifiers that the Bill of
Rights “prevents government from verging towards despotism.”198
Additionally, Virginia postponed voting on some of the amendments
because they fell short of “effectually guarding against the
apprehended mischief of the government” that the Virginia convention
amendments proposed.199
This examination of the original intent and public meaning of the
Bill of Rights is not meant to be exhaustive. Many other more
experienced and more knowledgeable authors have written on the
debates over the Bill of Rights. What I have shown, however, is that
both proponents and opponents of the Bill of Rights—Framers and the
public alike—acknowledged that the new government needed to be
constrained. Opponents believed that a bill of rights would actually
expand the powers of the government by what it left out, while
proponents believed that the Bill of Rights was necessary to restrict the
powers of the government. Whatever their arguments, the Bill of Rights
was passed. Regardless of what implications it had for federal power
not within its scope, all agreed it limited government power in the areas
it was directed.
C. Using History in Interpreting the Establishment Clause
Because the text of the First Amendment and the original
understanding and public meaning of the Bill of Rights implicate a
parallel between the Establishment Clause and free speech clause,
history should serve the same purpose in both settings. Having outlined
the originalist use of history in the free speech clause in Part V.A, this
Part will show how a parallel use of history in the Establishment Clause
would work.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the legislative prayer setting
serves as an example.200 In Town of Greece, all of the writers—majority,
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 921.
LABUNSKI, supra note 185, at 246 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Kaminski, supra note 1933, at 928.
See Part III.
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concurrence, and dissent—agreed that legislative prayer had a special
place in Establishment Clause jurisprudence because of its historical
roots.201 That analysis is similar to the analysis in Stevens.202 Both Justice
Roberts in Stevens and Justice Kennedy in Town of Greece
acknowledged that specific historical practices determined the scope of
the First Amendment’s warrant. In Stevens, the historical practices
helped to determine what speech was not protected by the First
Amendment. And in Town of Greece, historical practice helped to
determine what government actions would not violate the
Establishment Clause.
This approach would presumably uphold other government actions
with respect to religion (absent powerful historical research to the
contrary). Specifically, government actions that might be considered
“ceremonial deism”203 would not run afoul of such an interpretation.
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Lynch v. Donnelly, admitted even then
that government actions such as “the designation of ‘In God We Trust’
as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge
of Allegiance” would not violate the Establishment Clause, in part
because of their long use in America’s history.204 The majority in Lynch
noted that “it has never been thought either possible or desirable to
enforce a regime of total separation”205 just as the “prevention and
punishment of [certain kinds of speech] have never been thought to
raise any Constitutional problem.”206
Other kinds of government action related to religion might require
more extensive historical research. Unlike legislative prayer—whose
deep historical roots were widely acknowledged—many government
actions have not been shown to be so deeply held. Religious symbols
such as the Ten Commandments displays in Van Orden and McCreary
County or the Christmas displays in Lynch are not the same as
legislative prayer. There has not been a longstanding practice of the Ten
Commandments being posted by the government in every forum.207
201. See sources cited, supra notes 99–101.
202. See Part IV.A.
203. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Arthur
E. Sutherland, Book Review, IND. L. J. 83, 86 (1964) (quoting Dean Rostow's 1962 Meiklejohn
Lecture delivered at Brown University)).
204. See id. at 716–17.
205. Id. at 673 (majority opinion) (quoting Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973)).
206. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469 (2010) (quoting Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942)).
207. See, e.g., Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (holding that a Kentucky
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But the United States does have some tradition of posting the Ten
Commandments in certain places.208 The historical inquiry would play
a central role in determining what a longstanding historical practice is.
This historical inquiry would limit the scope of the “exceptions” to
the Establishment Clause. In order for a governmental action to be
constitutional, it would have to be longstanding and recognized in the
same way obscenity, libel, slander, and the rest of the free speech
exceptions are recognized. As evidenced in Parts II.A and III, this
would not be easy for the Establishment Clause. The historical record
is murky, and both the separationists and the accommodationists209
often have history on their side. In such situations, there would
inherently not be a longstanding historical practice and thus no
exception. While that may be drastic, that mirrors the approach that
free speech takes. And, as shown above, that is in line with the intent of
the Bill of Rights, which was designed to be government-constraining.
CONCLUSION
At the outset, I noted that I was assuming the fact that the
Establishment Clause has been incorporated against the states, as
doing so opens another door that has been explored extensively by
other authors. But my approach does call into question that
incorporation. If the Bill of Rights was intended as a restriction on the
federal government and if we must utilize history in a certain way
because of that, then incorporation becomes a dispositive question. If
the Fourteenth Amendment was not specifically intended to transfer
those limits on the federal government to state governments, this use
of history would only be applicable to federal actions (where very few
Establishment Clause cases arise). But that is another work for another
time.
Is my proposed use of history originalist? Originalists such as Scalia
and Rehnquist squarely rejected approaches such as this, as it seems to
support the “wall of separation” that Scalia and Rehnquist were eager
to tear down. But Justice Hugo Black was the one who “carried [the

statute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments on the wall of each public classroom
violated the Establishment Clause).
208. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 689–90 (2005) (describing longstanding areas
where the Ten Commandments have been posted, including in the Library of Congress, the
National Archives, the Department of Justice, and the District of Columbia federal courthouse).
209. See supra note 68.
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wall of separation] into the modern era,”210 and some have called him
the “inventor of originalism.”211
The Establishment Clause is unique. Because its historical record
and text are ambiguous, we must look beyond those sources. And today
we have the benefit of extensive historical analysis of the Bill of Rights.
The Bill of Rights would have been understood and intended as a
constraint on the federal government, and that is the approach we must
follow. That is what free speech jurisprudence does. Having the benefit
of years of free speech jurisprudence, we should use history similarly in
the Establishment Clause context. History is vital in originalism, and
rightly so. But it must be carefully and properly used.

210. Carl H. Esbeck, Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with
Religious Organizations, 41 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 347, 349 n.10 (1984).
211. NOAH FELDMAN, SCORPIONS: THE BATTLES AND TRIUMPHS OF FDR’S GREAT
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 145 (2010). See also D.A. Jeremy Telman, Originalism: A Thing
Worth Doing, 42 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 529, 535 n.23 (describing examples of Black’s use of
originalism).

